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A number of studies have indicated that peer smoking is a highly inﬂuential factor in a young
person’s decision to smoke. However, these results are suspect because the studies often fail to
account for selection and simultaneity bias. This paper develops an econometric model of youth
smoking which incorporates both peer eﬀects and selection eﬀects, and estimates its parameters
using data on California youth. Identiﬁcation is achieved by using the degree of selection on ob-
servables as a proxy for the degree of selection on unobservables. The results indicate that the
inﬂuence of peers on a young person’s decision to smoke is much weaker than is suggested by
reduced form models.
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1 Introduction
Youth smoking is a major public health concern in much of the world. The World Health Orga-
nization (Mackay and Eriksen 2002, p. 36) estimates that 4.2 million individuals die every year
from smoking-related conditions. As a result, governments often spend large sums on programs
to reduce tobacco use. Because tobacco is highly addictive and most smokers begin when they
are teenagers (Mackay and Eriksen 2002, p.28), tobacco control eﬀorts often focus on discouraging
young people from starting to smoke. Many of these eﬀorts aim to alter the social context of youth
smoking, due to a consensus among policymakers and researchers (Mackay and Eriksen 2002, Tyas
and Pederson 1998) that a young person’s decision to smoke is highly inﬂuenced by the behavior
and attitudes of his or her peers. From an economic standpoint, the case for extensive government
intervention in tobacco markets may be strengthened by the existence of signiﬁcant peer eﬀects,
as they imply an externality which may in principle lead to suboptimal outcomes even among ra-
tional individuals. For example, Kenkel, Reed, and Wang (2002) calibrate a “rational addiction”
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1model of lifetime tobacco use and ﬁnd that the optimal tobacco tax increases by over 50% when
peer eﬀects are included. In spite of the apparent consensus among researchers and policymakers,
the inﬂuence of peers in youth smoking is far from well-established. Most empirical studies in
the literature fail to account for both endogenous peer selection and the simultaneity of choice
among peers, both of which may lead a researcher to dramatically overestimate the strength of
peer inﬂuence (Manski 1993). More recent studies which attempt to account for selection and/or
simulteneity bias (Engels, Knibbe, Drop and de Haan 1997, Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Norton,
Lindrooth and Ennett 1998, Wang, Eddy and Fitzhugh 2000) have found mixed results.
This paper uses data from the 1994-2002 California Youth Tobacco Survey (CYTS) (Califor-
nia Department of Health Services 2003) to estimate the strength of peer inﬂuence in smoking
among young people. I use a simulation-based structural estimation method developed in Krauth
(2002) which explicitly allows for both endogenous peer selection and simultaneity of choice. This
approach is complementary to recent attempts to estimate peer eﬀects in youth smoking using in-
strumental variables (Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Norton et al. 1998) or panel data methods (Engels
et al. 1997, Wang et al. 2000), and has some signiﬁcant advantages over these other approaches.
The structural estimator addresses simultaneity by treating the group outcome as an endogenous
variable, and addresses selection by explicitly allowing correlation in unobservables between peers.
In order to achieve point identiﬁcation of the model parameters, this correlation is assumed to be
equal to the correlation in observables between peers. While this is a strong assumption, it is no
stronger than those assumptions used in IV and panel studies, and can be weakened substantially
while still generating informative interval estimates of the peer eﬀect.
The empirical results reported in this paper include point estimates under the assumption of
equal correlation in observables and unobservables as well as interval estimates consistent with
much weaker restrictions. The results indicate that observable characteristics are highly corre-
lated among peer group members, with an estimated correlation coeﬃcient of more than 0.5. If
we assume that peer group members have the same degree of correlation in unobservables, the
structural estimate of the peer eﬀect is less than one-tenth as large as the reduced form estimate
and fails to be statistically signiﬁcant. The results from interval estimation reduce the starkness
of this ﬁnding somewhat. A correlation in unobservables which is somewhere between zero and
0.5 produces estimates that imply peers have some inﬂuence. However, even in these results the
estimated peer eﬀect is well below the reduced form estimates. Taken as a whole, the results in
this paper suggest that peer are less inﬂuential in youth smoking than one might conclude from
2previous studies.
1.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature in public health and a smaller related literature in economics on the
determinants of tobacco use. Among adults, the strongest predictor of current smoking is smoking
as a young person. For example, Gruber and Zinman (2001) ﬁnd that 75% of adult current or
former smokers began before their 19th birthday. The literature on youth smoking has found
a number of variables that are closely associated with a young person’s smoking behavior in
multiple surveys. These variables include parental or sibling smoking, performance in school, race
and ethnicity, and prices1 (Gruber and Zinman 2001). Peer smoking is also, in the words of a
recent review article, “consistently found to be related to smoking initiation, maintenance, and
intentions” (Tyas and Pederson 1998).
However, the ﬁnding of a close statistical association between peer smoking and a respondent’s
own smoking does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Indeed, selection and simultane-
ity imply that the statistical association may dramatically overstate the strength of any causal
relationship. While this issue has been known for some time, it is only recently that empirical
studies of youth smoking that attempt to account for selection and simultaneity have appeared.
These studies have used either instrumental variables or panel data methods. In the economics
literature, the dominant approach uses group characteristics as instrumental variables for group
behavior. When these group characteristics are simply the group averages of the individual-level
regressors, as in Gaviria and Raphael (2001), this approach can lead to consistent estimates under
some strong but plausible assumptions. However, other researchers (Norton et al. 1998, for exam-
ple) have used other group characteristics (for example, population density of the neighborhood
the group lives in) which cannot in principle be valid instruments - if they have a direct impact
on the group’s average behavior, they must have a corresponding direct impact on the behavior of
individual group members. This diﬃculty in selecting truly exogenous instruments provides some
motivation for the use of alternative approaches to identiﬁcation.
In the public health literature, concern with selection issues has been addressed mostly using
panel data. These papers (Engels et al. 1997, Wang et al. 2000, for example) do not use regression-
based econometric analysis, but rather ask whether smoking tends to precede or follow membership
1DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2002) argue that the common ﬁnding of a high price elasticity of youth smoking is
an artifact of correlation between prices and unobserved local factors.
3in a peer group of smokers. If initial membership in a peer group of smokers predicts subsequent
transition into smoking, this is interpreted as evidence for a peer eﬀect. If initial smoking pre-
dicts subsequent transition into a higher-smoking peer group, this is interpreted as evidence for
a selection eﬀect. They ﬁnd evidence for the transition from smoking to membership in a peer
group of smokers, but no evidence for transition from membership in a peer group of smokers to
smoking. This result is generally taken to mean that the correlation in smoking among peers is
caused primarily by selection eﬀects and not peer eﬀects. However, these results are somewhat
weakened by the lack of a formal model of youth decision making. For example, if peer eﬀects op-
erate without a signiﬁcant lag, current behavior of group members may not be strongly associated
with future changes in group behavior even if peers are highly inﬂuential. While the results from
these longitudinal studies provide some evidence for selection, they may actually have little to say
about the strength of peer inﬂuence.
As discussed earlier, this paper pursues a structural approach. Although this approach is fairly
novel in the analysis of youth smoking, there is a recently-growing literature in econometrics on
empirical models of binary games. Kooreman (1994) and Tamer (2002) develop econometric models
of interdependent binary choice for the special case with two group members and no selection eﬀect.
Krauth (2002) and Kooreman and Soetevent (2002) extend this approach to an arbitrary group
size and incorporate inter-peer correlation in characteristics (i.e., peer selection). The structural
approach has several advantages over the IV and panel methods. First, it allows for more ﬂexibility
in the choice of identifying assumptions. While point identiﬁcation requires assumptions as strong
as those required by the IV methodology, it is only under the structural method used here that
informative interval estimates can be obtained with weaker assumptions. Second, the results can
be much more easily used to generate quantitative behavioral predictions than is possible with the
panel data approach in public health.
2 Data
The data set used for this study is the California Youth Tobacco Survey (CYTS), an annual
cross-sectional household-based survey of California youth aged 12 to 17 (California Department
of Health Services 2003). This study uses results from 1994 through 2002, and restricts attention
to respondents from age 14 through 17. The original data set contains 13,878 observations in
this age range, of which 13,037 have suﬃcient information for use in estimating the structural
4model. Summary statistics, after the data cleaning and imputations outlined below, are reported
in Table 1.
For each observation, there are two endogenous variables: a binary variable indicating the
current smoking status of the respondent, and a discrete variable indicating the fraction of the
respondent’s closest same-sex friends that smoke. The respondent is deﬁned as a “current smoker”
if he or she reports having smoked at least one cigarette in the previous 30 days. This measure
of smoking prevalence is standard in the literature. Because current smoking is self reported in
the CYTS, underreporting may be a concern. Section 3.4 describes how this issue is addressed
within the structural model. The peer smoking rate is deﬁned as the respondent’s estimate of the
fraction of his or her same sex “best friends” that smoke. The construction of this variable varies
somewhat in diﬀerent years of the CYTS. In the 1994-1999 surveys, the respondent is asked how
many best friends of each sex he or she has, and then how many of these friends smoke. The
number of best friends of each sex can vary from zero to seventy. In the 2000-2002 surveys, the
respondent is not asked the number of best friends, but is simply asked how many of his or her
four best friends of each sex smoke. In order to keep the computational time for the structural
estimator reasonable, it is necessary to place a cap on the number of friends. Any respondent who
reports more than six close friends is recoded as having exactly six friends, and the fraction of
friends who smoke is rounded to the nearest sixth. For example, if a respondent reports ten close
friends, seven of whom smoke, he is coded as having six close friends, four (6 ∗ 7/10 = 4.2 ≈ 4) of
whom smoke. Those respondents who did not report their own smoking behavior (76 obs.) or that
of their peers (92 obs.), or who reported having zero best friends (673 obs.) were dropped from
the sample. For comparison, summary statistics for the observations that were dropped from the
sample are reported in Table 1. As the table shows, those respondents who were dropped from
the sample are similar in observable characteristics to those who are included.
In addition to these variables, the CYTS includes information on demographics, family, work-
place and school environment, attitudes, and other risky behavior. The explanatory variables in-
cluded in the model include year, age, ethnicity (African-American, Hispanic, and other), whether
parents, teachers, or older siblings smoke, immigrant status, weekly disposable income, employ-
ment, performance in school, and classroom exposure to information about the risks of smoking.
Disposable income is top-coded at $200 per week, and missing values for disposable income are
replaced with the sample median of $15. Missing values for the other explanatory variables are
replaced by the sample mean for that variable.
52.1 Trends in youth smoking and tobacco control in California
The sample period saw two major changes in California’s tobacco control policy. The ﬁrst was the
passage of legislation which required almost all workplaces, including restaurants, to be smoke-free
beginning in January 1995, and bars to be smoke free beginning in January 1998. The second was
the January 1999 increase in state excise taxes from 37 cents to 87 cents per pack, as a result of
the passage of the voter initiative known as Proposition 10. This was the only change in state
excise taxes during the sample period. California’s excise tax rates – tied for 15th in 1994, 18th
in 2002 (Orzechowski and Walker 2002) – and level of per-capita expenditure on tobacco control
– 19th in 2002 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002a) – are above the median among
US states, though far from the highest.
Figure 1 shows the rate of self-reported current smoking among age 14-17 CYTS respondents
by year, as well as the rate of self-reported current smoking among US high school students as
calculated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2002b, 2003). Throughout
the sample period, California youth are approximately half as likely to smoke as youth in the
United States as a whole. California also shows a large decline in youth smoking from 1997 to
1999, possibly related to the policy changes during that period. Figure 2 shows the smoking rates
of California youth by year and birth cohort. As the ﬁgure shows, the smoking rate of each cohort
increases with age. In addition, the ﬁgure shows that the overall downward movement in smoking
rates over the sample period appears among all age groups.
3 Model
The econometric model is similar in spirit to the standard model of discrete choice with social
interaction eﬀects due to Brock and Durlauf (2001). Both the model and estimation method are
described in greater detail in Krauth (2002).
3.1 Preferences and peer groups
In the model, each individual is a member of a peer group. Peer groups are indexed by g ∈ Z+,
and group g has ng ≥ 2 members, where ng is exogenous and may vary across groups. Within each
peer group, individuals are indexed by i, so that the pair i,g identiﬁes an individual. Each member
of a peer group is inﬂuenced symmetrically by each other member, and there are no cross-group
inﬂuences.
6Individuals choose either to smoke (si,g = 1) or not (si,g = 0). An individual’s utility function
ui,g(si,g) satisﬁes the following:
ui,g(1) − ui,g(0) = α + βxi,g + λzg + γ¯ si,g + i,g (1)
where xi,g is a vector of individual-level exogenous variables (e.g., ethnicity, sex, parental and
sibling behavior, disposable income), zg is a vector of group-level exogenous variables (e.g., prices,








and i,g is an unobserved individual-level term. The model thus incorporates an endogenous2 peer
eﬀect (γ¯ si,g) into an otherwise standard discrete choice model of smoking. An individual will prefer
to smoke (si,g = 1) if and only if his or her incremental utility from doing so is positive. However,
because this incremental utility depends in part on the average choice of peers (¯ si,g), predictions
on the behavior of individuals cannot be derived in isolation. Instead, it is necessary to analyze
behavior in equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium
Given the exogenous variables, the observed choices of individuals are assumed to be a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies of a complete information simultaneous move game, where player
i,g’s strategy is given by si,g and his or her payoﬀ function is described by equation (1). Because
there may be multiple Nash equilibria for some draws of the exogenous variables, the model
is supplemented with an equilibrium selection rule: the endogenous variables are assumed to
take on the values associated with the lowest-activity Nash equilibrium for the given exogenous
variables. This selection rule is chosen because it corresponds to the steady state of the myopic
best-reply dynamics reached when agents start as nonsmokers. Given that young people are born
as nonsmokers and that teen smokers rarely quit while young, such a dynamic process may be a
reasonable model of behavior. Monte Carlo results reported in Krauth (2002) suggest that for low
2The model does not include what are known as “contextual eﬀects”, in which the characteristics (as opposed to
smoking behavior) of one’s peers have a direct eﬀect on the relative utility of smoking. Since Manski (1993) pointed
out the diﬃculties in doing so, empirical researchers rarely attempt to simultaneously estimate endogenous eﬀects and
contextual eﬀects. It is more common (Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001, for example) to simply
ignore one or the other and note that the estimated endogenous (contextual) eﬀect could be reinterpreted as contextual
(endogenous). That caveat applies to this article as well.
7to moderate peer eﬀects, misspeciﬁcation in the equilibrium selection rule has minimal impact on
the resulting estimates.
3.3 Peer selection and correlation in characteristics
As indicated in the introduction, the structural model estimated in this paper allows for the
likelihood that a young person’s choice of peer group is not entirely random. This is done by
incorporating a reduced-form correlation in both observable and unobservable characteristics across
members of the same peer group. That is, the exogenous variables are identically distributed across
all individuals in the population, and are independent across members of diﬀerent peer groups but
are not independent across members of the same peer group. Although it might be desirable to
formally model the process of selecting one’s peer group, estimating such a model would require
substantially more detail on group composition than is available.
The details are as follows. The joint distribution of the individual-level exogenous variables is
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with the distribution being deﬁned analogously for other values of ng.
Equation (3) deﬁnes a probability distribution with several useful characteristics. First, with
the exception of the dependence across peers, the distribution corresponds to that in a standard
probit model. In particular, for all individuals i,g the conditional distribution of unobservables
has i,g|xi,g ∼ N(0,1). Unlike a standard probit model, this model allows for correlation in both
observable characteristics (ρx) and unobservable characteristics (ρ) across group members, as
would occur when young people are prone to selecting friends who are similar to themselves. The
“naive” analysis pursued in much of the literature on peer eﬀects implicitly assumes that peer
grouop selection is random (ρ = ρx = 0).
In order to obtain point estimates of model parameters, it is necessary to impose an additional
restriction on ρ, the between-peer correlation in unobservables. The primary restriction used
8in this paper is that the correlation is the same as the correlation in observables, i.e. ρ = ρx.
The idea of using the degree of selection on observables as a proxy for the degree of selection on
unobservables was ﬁrst proposed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2000) to correct for selection eﬀects
in measuring the eﬀect of attending a Catholic school. These authors demonstrate that equality
in these two correlations will hold (in expectation) if the observables are a random subset of a
large set of relevant variables. Alternatively, if the observed variables are more highly correlated
between peers than the unobserved variables, the equal-correlation point estimate of the peer eﬀect
will be biased downwards. This is a distinct possibility, as personal information that is particularly
easily gathered in surveys (race, sex, age) may also be more easily observed by potential friends.
In any case, the model can also be estimated under alternative restrictions on ρ, including interval
restrictions. As a result, the results reported in this paper allow readers with diﬀerent prior beliefs
about the selection process to construct their own range of estimates consistent with both the data
and their prior beliefs.
3.4 Actual smoking and reported smoking
One serious issue with this and similar data sets is that adolescent self-reports of their smoking
and that of their peers are known to be biased. Norton, Lindrooth, and Ennett (2003) provide
a good recent discussion of these issues. First, despite eﬀorts by survey collectors to emphasize
and ensure conﬁdentiality, young people tend to underreport their own smoking. Audit studies
(Wagenknecht, Burke, Perkins, Haley and Friedman 1992, for example) that compare self-reported
smoking with breath or saliva tests often ﬁnd substantial underreporting. Second, young people
also tend to overestimate the extent to which their peers smoke (Norton, Lindrooth and Ennett
2003). Smokers have a particularly high propensity to overestimate the fraction of their peers that
smoke, an example of what psychologists call the ‘false consensus’ eﬀect. The CYTS data exhibit
clear signs of some combination of underreported own smoking and overreported peer smoking:
13.1% of respondents are current smokers, whereas 21.3% of their close friends are smokers. As the
respondents and their friends are drawn from the same population, and should thus have similar
smoking rates, biased reporting is a clear issue. Biased reporting has particular implications for
the estimation method developed in this paper. Closing the model in order to have a well-deﬁned
likelihood function requires modeling the relationship between a person’s actual smoking behavior,
his or her self-report of that behavior to the survey interviewer, and the perception of that behavior
by his or her peers.
9Because actual behavior is not observed in our survey, the model of reporting behavior used
here is quite simple. First, it is assumed that peer smoking is reported truthfully. Second, it is
assumed that smokers falsely report as nonsmokers with a ﬁxed probability pr
3. Let ri,g indicate





si,g with probability pr
0 with probability 1 − pr
(4)






The parameter pr can thus be estimated using the sample analogue to this expression.
4 Estimation
Given the model outlined in Section 3, this section describes how the model is estimated using
the CYTS data. Let N be the number of observations in the data . Because the CYTS is a
household-based random sample from a large population, it can be assumed that each observation
represents a member of a diﬀerent peer group. Without loss of generality, let the gth observation
in the data set be identiﬁed as describing person 1 of group g.
4.1 Naive estimator
In order to facilitate comparison with previous work, I ﬁrst apply a naive probit estimator to
the data. The naive estimator is simply the standard maximum likelihood probit estimator which
treats average peer behavior ¯ s as an exogenous variable. In other words, I use maximum likelihood
to estimate a model in which
Pr(r1,g = 1|x1,g,zg, ¯ s1,g) = Φ

˜ α + ˜ βx1,g + ˜ λzg + ˜ γ¯ s1,g

(6)
3I do allow pr to vary across years.
10where Φ is the CDF for the standard normal distribution. In addition I estimate a second naive
model which corrects for reporting bias as described in Section 3.4. In this case:
Pr(r1,g = 1|x1,g,zg, ¯ s1,g) = prΦ

˜ ˜ α + ˜ ˜ βx1,g + ˜ ˜ λzg + ˜ ˜ γ¯ s1,g

(7)











and the remaining parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. Because both these naive
estimators treat peer behavior as exogenous, the (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimators of ˜ γ
and ˜ ˜ γ are not consistent estimators of the true peer eﬀect γ. These estimates are reported for
comparison with the structural estimates, and to demonstrate the cost of ignoring selection and
simultaneity.
4.2 Structural estimator: Point estimates
Next, the model is estimated by the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) method developed
in Krauth (2002). The vector of parameters to be estimated is θ ≡ (pr,α,β,λ,γ,µ,σ,ρx,ρ).
Observations are indexed by g; observation g in the data set is treated as describing person 1 in
group g. For each observation, the GHK simulator (Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud 1996) is
used to estimate the conditional likelihood Pr(r1,g, ¯ s1,g|x1,g,zg;θ). This approximate conditional




ln ˆ Pr(r1,g, ¯ s1,g|x1,g,zg;θ) (9)
where ˆ Pr is the simulation-based estimate of the true probability Pr, and ˆ L(θ) is thus a simulation-
based estimate of the true log-likelihood function L(θ). The parameter vector θ is then chosen to



















11ρ = ρx ≡ ρ (13)
Restriction (10) implies that the peer group covariance matrix is positive deﬁnite. The nonneg-
ativity constraint on the peer eﬀect in restriction (11) is necessary for computational purposes;
this constraint does not bind for this particular data set. However, it should be noted that if
γ is exactly zero, the bootstrap method used to estimate the covariance matrix of estimates is
inconsistent (Andrews 2000), and the t-statistic for γ has a nonstandard asymptotic distribution.
As a result, signiﬁcance tests for γ are not performed in this paper. Finally equation (13) gives
the equal-correlation restriction discussed in Section 3.3.
Krauth (2002) describes the estimation method and its properties in detail, and reports the
outcome of various Monte Carlo experiments. Results in that paper include:
1. If the model is correctly speciﬁed, the structural estimator of the peer eﬀect is consistent and
has much lower bias than the naive probit estimator.
2. Deviations from normality in the explanatory variables do not have a substantial eﬀect on
parameter estimates.
3. The equilibrium selection rule has no eﬀect on parameter estimates when the peer eﬀect is
zero; in that case equilibrium is always unique. The potential bias due to an incorrectly
speciﬁed equilibrium selection rule increases gradually in the strength of the peer eﬀect.
4. The variance of the estimator depends strongly and negatively on the explanatory power of
the individual-level observables. When these variables have strong explanatory power, the
peer eﬀect will be more precisely estimated.
4.3 Structural estimator: Interval estimates
As the equal-correlation assumption (13) reﬂects a strong and possibly incorrect restriction on
the model, one might also want to explore the eﬀect of alternative or weaker restrictions. While
some sort of restriction on ρ is needed to achieve identiﬁcation, the structural model allows one
to obtain interval estimates of the peer eﬀect under interval restrictions on ρ.






the model, replacing the equal-correlation restriction (13) with the restriction:
ρ = P (14)
12Deﬁne the function ˆ γ(P) as the point estimate of the peer eﬀect γ under the restriction ρ = P.
















Because the selection of a plausible interval restriction on ρ is a subjective matter, in reporting
results I report values4 for the function ˆ γ(ρ) and leave the reader to apply the formula (15).
Another alternative to interval estimation is to estimate both ρx and ρ under the restriction:
γ = 0 (16)
in place of (13). The resulting estimates answer the question “How high does the within-group




Table 2 reports point estimates using both naive and structural estimators. Estimated standard
errors are calculated for the naive estimators using the inverse Hessian of the log-likelihood func-
tion, and calculated for the structural model using the simple bootstrap with 100 replications. In
addition to the explanatory variables reported in the table, year eﬀects are included to control for
any aggregate shocks such as changes in cigarette taxes. The year eﬀects are treated as aggregate
variables (zg in the model) and all other variables are treated as individual-level characteristics
(xi,g in the model).
The ﬁrst column shows the results from a naive probit estimator using a baseline speciﬁcation
that includes the same set of variables used in the structural model. In particular, the peer
eﬀect is calculated using the measure of friend smoking that has been rounded to the nearest
4It should be noted that it is only possible to calculate a value of ˆ γ(P) at a ﬁnite number of points in the interval,
implying that the true minimum or maximum may not be found. However, it can be proved that ˆ γ(P) is continuous,
implying that checking a suﬃciently ﬁne grid of points in the interval will yield a reasonable approximation to the true
minimum and maximum. In addition, experience with the estimator suggests that ˆ γ(P) is strictly decreasing, though
that has yet to be proved. If true, this would imply one only needs to calculate ˆ γ(P0) and ˆ γ(P1).
13sixth for all respondents who report more than six friends, and the number of friends is not
included as an explanatory variable. According to the baseline estimates, a young person’s smoking
has a strong association with the fraction of his or her friends that smoke, and a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant association with the smoking of teachers, parents, and siblings. Youth
smoking exhibits signiﬁcant variation by ethnicity, with African-American youth much less likely to
smoke than others. Smoking increases with age and income, and is higher among young people who
work (possibly through increased income, increased independence, or exposure to older smokers).
Finally, students who report they are doing well in school are less likely to smoke than those
who report they are doing poorly. These results are all consistent with previous ﬁndings in the
literature.
The second column in Table 2 shows the results from the naive probit with the underreporting
correction. Note that the sign of all signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is the same as in the ﬁrst column,
but the magnitude of each signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is between 10% and 30% higher. This does not
imply a great diﬀerence in the predictions of the two models: calculated marginal eﬀects on the
probability of being a self-reported current smoker are similar with and without the underreporting
correction. However, because the structural estimator includes the underreporting correction,
parameter estimates from that model should be compared with estimates from the underreporting-
corrected naive probit estimator in the second column rather than the uncorrected estimator in
the ﬁrst column.
The third and fourth columns in Table 2 provide a simple robustness check on model speciﬁ-
cation. They are estimated using the original unadjusted data for the fraction of friends smoking,
and include the reported number of friends as an explanatory variable. As the table shows, these
two changes have almost no eﬀect on the results. This result provides some conﬁdence that the
rounding of the friends smoking variable for computational ease does not materially aﬀect the
results.
The ﬁfth column in Table 2 displays parameter estimates from the structural model. The
non-peer explanatory variables generally have signs and magnitudes which are consistent with the
results from the baseline probit models. However, the measured peer eﬀect has fallen dramatically
from 2.789 to 0.235, a decline of over 90%. The reason for this is that the measured selection eﬀect
(between-peer correlation in characteristics) is quite high at 0.544.
It is potentially informative at this point to consider how the selection eﬀect and peer eﬀect
are simultaneously identiﬁed in this model. The estimated selection eﬀect is identiﬁed essentially
14from the correlation between the respondent’s observed characteristics and the average choice of
his or her peers. If the respondent’s characteristics (as opposed to his or her choice) are strongly
associated with the choice of the peers, then this is evidence supporting a high correlation between
the respondent’s observed characteristics and the characteristics of his or her peers. Because
of the assumption of equal correlation in observables and unobservables, this high correlation
in observable characteristics implies high correlation in unobservables as well. Once the high
correlation in characteristics is considered, the observed correlation in behavior between peers can
be explained without a strong peer eﬀect. As a result, the estimated peer eﬀect is much lower
than is implied by a naive model without correlation in unobservables.
5.2 Interval estimates
The point estimates from the structural model reported in the previous section were derived by em-
ploying the assumption of equal correlation in observable and unobservable characteristics. While
this assumption is both plausible and useful for generating point estimates, it may of course be
false. Table 3 displays estimates of (γ,ρx,ρ) from the structural model with the equal correlation
restriction (13) replaced by alternative restrictions, as described in Section 4.3. Standard errors
are calculated using the simple bootstrap with 30 replications. Table 3 can be used, in combination
with the formula in equation (15), to construct interval estimates of the peer eﬀect under user-
speciﬁed restrictions on the selection eﬀect. For example, suppose that ρ ∈ [0.0,0.544], i.e., the
correlation in unobservables is positive, and no more than the estimated correlation in observables
(from the point estimates). In that case the interval estimate of the peer eﬀect (interpolating
linearly between 0.5 and 0.6) would be approximately [1.548,0.185]. Note that even with the as-
sumption of no correlation in unobservables, the estimated peer eﬀect of 1.548 is nearly 45% lower
than the estimated peer eﬀect of 2.789 from the underreporting-corrected naive probit. This is
because the structural model eliminates one source of bias in the naive probit, the simultaneity of
choice among peers. In other words almost half of the apparent peer eﬀect is the result of simple
simultaneity bias. At the same time, a peer behavior coeﬃcient of 1.548 still indicates a nontrivial
peer eﬀect.
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the paper graphically by plotting the estimated peer eﬀect
(γ) against the assumed or estimated selection eﬀect (ρ). The two points on the left side of the
graph represent the naive estimates (which implicitly assume no selection eﬀect). The point in the
center represents the point estimate from the structural model, and the dotted ellipse surrounding
15it is a 95% joint asymptotic conﬁdence region. The solid line represents the estimated ˆ γ(ρ)
function, and the dotted lines represent a pointwise 95% asymptotic conﬁdence band.
5.3 Interpretation and comparison to previous ﬁndings
To give the estimated coeﬃcients a more intuitive interpretation which is comparable across models,
Table 4 reports the results from a simple thought experiment. Consider a representative individual
who has four close friends (the median in the CYTS data) who are all nonsmokers, and has a set
of observed characteristics such that the model predicts his or her probability of self-reporting as
a smoker to be exactly 13.177%, the mean in the CYTS data. Suppose that 25% of the relevant
peer group (e.g., one of the four friends) suddenly switches from a non-smoker to a smoker. By
how many percentage points does the model predict the representative individual’s probability of
smoking5 would increase? That quantity (∆Pr(y = 1)), for both the models estimated here and
for several other recent studies, is reported in Table 4.
The estimates in Table 4 come from researchers in economics, public health, and psychology,
and employ a variety of methods and deﬁnitions of peer group. However, a few common patterns
appear across the studies. First, peer eﬀects are generally found to be substantial, in some cases
implausibly so. Second, close friends appear to be more inﬂuential than larger peer groups such
as schoolmates or neighbors. However, it should be noted that the simultaneity bias in naive
estimators is likely to be larger with smaller peer groups. Third, those researchers who have
employed instrumental variables methods (Gaviria and Raphael, Norton et al., and Powell et
al.) have tended to ﬁnd that these methods have very little impact on the estimated peer eﬀect.
Given the similarity in choice of instruments among the three studies, the consistency of this
ﬁnding strongly suggests either that there is no correlation in unobservable characteristics among
5For standard probit or logit models with coeﬃcient on peer smoking β, I calculate this as:
∆Pr(y = 1) = F(F
−1(0.13177) + β ∗ 0.25) − 0.13177
where F is the logistic CDF, standard normal CDF, or identity function, depending on whether the researcher is
estimating a logit, probit, or linear probability model respectively. In two papers (Lloyd-Richardson and Wang) the
number of friends smoking is treated as a categorical variable, in which case β is the coeﬃcient on the binary variable
“one friend smokes”, with “no friends smoke” being the excluded category, and:
∆Pr(y = 1) = F(F
−1(0.13177) + β) − 0.13177
Finally, for the models with underreporting corrections in this paper and in Krauth (2004), it is also necessary to include
the estimated reporting rate (r):
∆Pr(y = 1) = rΦ(Φ
−1(0.13177/r) + β ∗ 0.25) − 0.13177
16schoolmates and neighbors, or that the instruments are invalid.
In contrast, the two reported sets of estimates using the structural method show a substantial
decline in the measured peer eﬀect. In addition to the results for this study, I report the results
from a related study of youth smoking in Canada (Krauth 2004). In both cases, the structural
model reports much lower peer eﬀects. In the Canada data, the structural model estimate of the
peer eﬀect remains economically signiﬁcant: the eﬀect of one of the representative individual’s
friends becoming a smoker is to increase the representative individual’s probability of smoking by
5.8 percentage points. In the California data, the decline in the estimated peer eﬀect is much larger:
the representative individual’s probability of smoking increases by only 1.1 percentage points.
6 Conclusion
A variety of diﬀerent approaches to youth tobacco control eﬀorts compete for public and philan-
thropic resources. Some, including tax increases or access and use restrictions aim at aﬀecting
incentives. Others attempt to change social norms about smoking through advertising, celebrity
endorsement of nonsmoking, in-school antismoking programs, etc. Interventions to change social
norms are based in part on the belief that social inﬂuences have a great deal to do with a young
person’s decision to smoke. If more careful analysis of the data overturn this belief, the implications
for tobacco control policy are substantial.
The structural estimation approach applied in this paper provides a complementary method-
ology to that employed in previous studies. I model members of a peer group as having correlated
observed and unobserved characteristics, as would be implied by nonrandom peer selection, and I
model the interdependent choices of respondents and their peers as equilibrium phenomena. Ap-
plied to data on youth smoking in California, I ﬁnd that there is a high degree of correlation in
characteristics between groups of close friends, and that this correlation explains over 90% of the
apparent peer eﬀect.
This result is consistent with those from longitudinal studies of young people, which gener-
ally ﬁnd that smokers tend to acquire smoking friends over time to a much greater extent than
nonsmokers tend to become smokers after being friends with smokers. However, it is inconsistent
with those studies using instrumental variables, which generally ﬁnd no evidence for endogeneity
bias in naive estimators of peer eﬀects. The apparent consensus of studies using a given method
and disagreement between studies using diﬀerent methods is a clear puzzle in this literature. It
17might be of interest in the future to apply all three methods to a single data set, for example
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, that features both detailed school-based
samples (necessary for the IV approach) and longitudinal data (necessary for the panel approach),
to see more clearly why the diﬀerent methods yield such diﬀerent conclusions. Alternatively, it
may be useful to investigate follow-up data from experimental program evaluations of successful
antismoking programs, using the methodology of Boozer and Cacciola (2001): if the program is
given to randomly selected classes in a given grade, and students from the treatment and control
groups are exogenously mixed in subsequent grades, the fraction of classmates in the treatment
group can be a valid instrumental variable for peer smoking. In any case, the conﬂict in ﬁndings
remains an open puzzle.
An additional avenue for future research using this method is to estimate peer eﬀects for
alternative peer groups, such as classrooms, schools, and neighborhoods, as well as extending the
model to include the simultaneous inﬂuence of more than one type of group. Although it is valuable
to know whether peers are inﬂuential in the smoking decisions of young people, design of eﬀective
peer-based tobacco control programs will tend to depend critically on identifying exactly which
peers are inﬂuential.
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20A Tables and Figures
Included Dropped
Variable name Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev.
Current smoker 0.132 0.338 – –
Fraction of friends smoking 0.213 0.308 – –
Number of friends 4.043 1.370 – –
Age 15.429 1.104 15.360 1.108
Teacher’s smoking (1-3 scale) 2.162 0.700 2.092 0.719
Discussed health risks in class 0.772 0.416 0.764 0.421
At least one parent smokes 0.327 0.469 0.321 0.467
At least one sibling smokes 0.173 0.378 0.158 0.365
Male 0.503 0.500 0.537 0.499
African-American 0.065 0.247 0.082 0.275
Hispanic 0.364 0.481 0.382 0.486
Asian/other 0.092 0.289 0.090 0.286
US born 0.868 0.338 0.853 0.355
Weekly disposable income, $ 29.982 40.204 30.038 41.220
Paid job 0.263 0.440 0.231 0.421
Above average in school 0.560 0.493 0.563 0.492
Below average in school 0.031 0.173 0.039 0.191
# observations 13,037 841
Table 1: Summary statistics for 1994-2002 CYTS data. Columns labeled “Included” describe data
included in estimation, columns labeled “Dropped” describe data dropped because of missing data
on endogenous variables (current smoking and/or friend smoking).
21Variable Naive probit Structural
Name Baseline Alternate Estimator
Speciﬁcation Speciﬁcation
Selection eﬀect (ρ) – – – – 0.544
(0.058)
Peer eﬀect (γ) 1.993 2.789 1.991 2.789 0.235
(0.049) (0.086) (0.049) (0.087) (0.180)
Age 1.897 2.187 1.879 2.173 0.757
(0.539) (0.723) (0.539) (0.724) (0.407)
Age2 -0.056 -0.064 -0.055 -0.063 -0.016
(0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023) (0.013)
Teacher smoking 0.102 0.126 0.101 0.126 0.241
(0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.023)
Discuss health risks in class -0.027 -0.017 -0.028 -0.018 -0.079
(0.042) (0.057) (0.042) (0.057) (0.034)
Parent smokes 0.079 0.093 0.079 0.093 0.272
(0.035) (0.049) (0.035) (0.049) (0.036)
Sibling smokes 0.393 0.535 0.392 0.535 0.589
(0.039) (0.056) (0.039) (0.056) (0.046)
Male 0.005 -0.038 0.006 -0.031 0.062
(0.034) (0.046) (0.034) (0.046) (0.033)
African-American -0.649 -0.806 -0.649 -0.807 -0.550
(0.091) (0.118) (0.091) (0.118) (0.072)
Hispanic -0.132 -0.142 -0.132 -0.142 -0.094
(0.039) (0.052) (0.039) (0.052) (0.038)
Asian/Other -0.155 -0.166 -0.155 -0.170 -0.123
(0.066) (0.088) (0.066) (0.088) (0.053)
U.S. born 0.151 0.177 0.149 0.171 0.238
(0.059) (0.077) (0.059) (0.077) (0.055)
Disposable income (100$) 0.151 0.193 0.151 0.196 0.340
(0.041) (0.059) (0.041) (0.059) (0.040)
Paid job 0.173 0.225 0.172 0.227 0.118
(0.040) (0.055) (0.040) (0.055) (0.036)
Above avg in school -0.249 -0.322 -0.248 -0.323 -0.511
(0.036) (0.048) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035)
Below avg in school 0.448 0.719 0.444 0.709 0.743
(0.078) (0.128) (0.078) (0.128) (0.104)
# of friends – – 0.000 -0.005 –
(0.003) (0.005)
Year eﬀects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underreporting correction? No Yes No Yes Yes
Table 2: Regression results, with estimated standard errors in parentheses.
22Identifying Restriction ˆ γ ˆ ρx ˆ ρ
ρ = ρx 0.235 0.544 0.544
(0.180) (0.058) (0.058)
ρ = 0.0 1.548 0.455 –
(0.026) (0.023)
ρ = 0.1 1.245 0.499 –
(0.027) (0.022)
ρ = 0.2 0.978 0.529 –
(0.026) (0.022)
ρ = 0.3 0.736 0.552 –
(0.028) (0.023)
ρ = 0.4 0.503 0.575 –
(0.029) (0.021)
ρ = 0.5 0.281 0.596 –
(0.030) (0.023)
ρ = 0.6 0.063 0.614 –
(0.035) (0.027)
γ = 0.0 – 0.578 0.669
(0.099) (0.092)
Table 3: Estimated peer/selection eﬀect under alternative identifying restrictions. Estimated standard
errors in parentheses.
23Source Estimation Implied
(peer group) Method ∆Pr(smoke)
Alexander et al., 2001
(school) Naive (logit) 24.2%
Gaviria and Raphael, 2001
(schools) Naive (LPM) 4.0%
IV (2SLS LPM) 3.9%
Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2002
(3 best friends) Naive (logit) 28.4%
Norton et al.,1998
(neighborhood) Naive (probit) 25.4% - 54.5%
IV (2-stage probit) 26.4% - 86.0%
Norton et al., 2003
(3 best friends) Naive (LPM) 13.2%
(school) Naive (LPM) 9.9%
Powell et al., 2003
(school) Naive (probit) 13.9%
IV (AGLS probit) 13.5%
Wang et al., 1995
(4 best friends) Naive (logit) 31.4% - 48.7%
Krauth (2004)
(close friends) Naive (probit) 15.7%
Naive w/underrep. 18.5%
Structural, no corr. 8.4%
Structural, equal corr. 5.8%
This paper
(close friends) Naive (probit) 13.6%
Naive w/underrep. 15.3%
Structural, no corr. 7.9%
Structural, equal corr. 1.1%
Table 4: Comparison of estimated peer eﬀects in this paper and in previous studies. To facilitate
comparison across diﬀerent models, results are stated in terms of the increase in probability that
a representative individual will be a (self-reported) smoker in response to a 25% increase in peer


































Figure 1: Rates of current smoking among young people in California and entire United States, 1993-
2002. California smoking rates based on author’s calculations using CYTS, national smoking rates





































































naive estimate w/underreporting correction
· naive estimate
Alternative SML estimates
Figure 3: Estimated peer eﬀect (γ) for alternative assumptions about selection eﬀect (ρ). Individual
points represent point estimate from naive probit model or baseline structural model with equal-
correlation assumption. Solid line represents alternative estimates of γ as a function of the assumed
value of ρ. Dashed lines depict 95% conﬁdence intervals or ellipses.
26B Notes for referees (not for publication)
This section describes in greater detail the construction of Table 4. Because of diﬀerences in
estimation methods across studies, and diﬀerences in standard reporting methods between re-
searchers in health and in economics, some degree of subjective interpretation is involved. This
section describes how each paper was interpreted to generate the estimate in Table 4.
B.1 Alexander et al. 2001
1. Data: Grade 7-12 students in the U.S. National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of other students in school (also reported for peer network,
best friend, etc., but not in easily translated form).
3. Method: Logistic regression, odds ratios reported.
4. Estimates: Estimated odds ratio associated with a 10% increase in school smoking is 1.73
(Table 2, column 1). This implies that the logit coeﬃcient on school smoking is ln1.73
0.10 = 5.481.
Predicted eﬀect of a 25% increase in school smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.131778) + 5.481 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.2422265
B.2 Gaviria and Raphael 2002
1. Data: Grade 10 students in the U.S. National Educational Longitudinal Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of other students in school.
3. Method: Linear probability models, estimated through OLS and IV.
4. Estimates: OLS estimate of LPM coeﬃcient is 0.158 (Table 3, column 4). 2SLS/IV estimate
is 0.156 (Table 5, column 4). Given that we have a linear probability model:
∆Pr(s = 1) = 0.158 ∗ 0.25 for OLS estimator
= 0.0395
∆Pr(s = 1) = 0.156 ∗ 0.25 for 2SLS estimator
= 0.0390
B.3 Lloyd-Richardson et al. 2002
1. Data: Grade 7-12 students in the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate among 3 best friends.
3. Method: Logistic regression, odds ratios reported.
4. Estimates: Odds ratio for 1 peer who smokes vs. 0 peers who smoke was 4.68 (Table 2,
column 2), implying logit coeﬃcient of ln(4.68) = 1.543. Eﬀect of a one person (33% in this
case) increase in best friend smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.131778) + 1.543) − 0.131778
= 0.284
27B.4 Norton et al. 1998
1. Data: Grade 6 and grade 8 students in a U.S. longitudinal study of the DARE anti-drug use
program.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of students who had attended the same elementary school.
The authors argue that this estimates neighborhood eﬀects rather than school eﬀects, because
the students are no longer in elementary school.
3. Method: Probit regression, with and without IV.
4. Estimates: Naive coeﬃcient is 6.31 (Table 3, column 1) in grade 6, 3.31 (Table 3, column 3)
in grade 8. 2-stage coeﬃcient is 14 (Table 5, column 3) in grade 6, 3.42 (Table 5, column 4)
in grade 8. Eﬀect of a 25% increase in school smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 6.31 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.545
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 3.31 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.254
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 14 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.860
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 3.42 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.264
(17)
B.5 Norton, et al. 2003
1. Data: Grade 9 students in a North Carolina study, grade 5 and 6 students in an Illinois
study.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of 3 best friends (North Carolina); school (Illinois).
3. Method: Linear probability models. The researchers also included perceived smoking of peers
(as distinct from their actual smoking) as an explanatory variable.
4. Estimates: For North Carolina best friends, LPM coeﬃcient is 0.526 (Table 1, column 1),
for Illinois school, LPM coeﬃcient is 0.397 (Table 1, column 2). Eﬀect of a 25% increase in
peer smoking is :
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.526 ∗ 0.25
= .1315
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.397 ∗ 0.25
= .0993
B.6 Powell, et al. 2003
1. Data: High school students in the U.S. Study of Smoking and Tobacco Use Among Young
People.
2. Peer group: Smoking rate of other students in school.
3. Method: Probit regression, also probit with instrumental variables (estimated by AGLS).
Marginal eﬀects rather than probit coeﬃcients are reported.
284. Estimates: Marginal eﬀect from simple probit was 0.5573 (Table 2, column 1), from AGLS
estimator was 0.5385 (Table 2, column 2). Eﬀect of a 25% increase in school smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.5573 ∗ 0.25
= 0.139
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.5385 ∗ 0.25
= 0.135
B.7 Wang et al. 1995
1. Data: Youth age 14-18 in the U.S. Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of four same-sex best friends (0 smokers vs. 1-2 smokers
vs. 3-4 smokers).
3. Method: Logistic regression, separately for each age, odds ratios reported.
4. Estimates: Odds ratio of 1-2 smokers vs 0 smokers among peers varies from 5.3 (Table 1,
column 3) to 10.7 (Table 1, column 2). Therefore logit coeﬃcient (on dummy variable “1-2
smokers among friends”) varies from 1.66707 to 2.370244. Eﬀect of an increase in best-friend
smoking from zero to one is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.131778) + 1.66707) − 0.131778
= 0.3140311
∆Pr(y = 1) = Λ(Λ−1(0.131778) + 2.370244) − 0.131778
= 0.4871306
B.8 Krauth 2004
1. Data: Youth age 15-19 in the Canada Youth Smoking Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of close friends (size of peer group self-reported).
3. Method: Naive probit with and without underreporting correction, structural probit.
4. Estimates: Coeﬃcient from naive probit without underreporting correction 2.240 (Table 2,
column 1), with correction 3.626 (Table 2, column 2), from structural model 1.251 (Table
2, column 3). Coeﬃcient from structural model with no sorting (ρ = 0) is 1.745 (Table 4,
column 1). Estimated reporting rate is 0.544. Eﬀect of a 25% increase in peer smoking is:
Eﬀect of a 25% increase in peer smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 2.240 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.157
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.544 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.544) + 3.626 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.185
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.544 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.544) + 1.251 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.058
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.544 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.544) + 1.745 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.084
B.9 Krauth (this paper)
1. Data: Youth age 14-17 in the 1994-2002 California Youth Tobacco Survey.
2. Peer group measure: Smoking rate of same-sex close friends (size of peer group self-reported).
293. Method: Naive probit with and without underreporting correction, structural probit.
4. Estimates: Coeﬃcient from naive probit without underreporting correction 1.993 (Table 2,
column 1), with correction 2.789 (Table 2, column 2), from structural model 0.235 (Table
2, column 5). Coeﬃcient from structural model with no sorting (ρ = 0) is 1.548 (Table 3,
column 1). Estimated reporting rate is 0.618. Eﬀect of a 25% increase in peer smoking is:
∆Pr(y = 1) = Φ(Φ−1(0.131778) + 1.993 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.136
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.618 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.618) + 2.789 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.153
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.618 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.618) + 0.235 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.011
∆Pr(y = 1) = 0.618 ∗ Φ(Φ−1(0.131778/0.618) + 1.548 ∗ 0.25) − 0.131778
= 0.079
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